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Revisions of Earnings Forecasts and Security Returns:   
Evidence from Three Countries 
Abstract : 
Prior evidence has demonstrated that for North American markets EPS forecast 
revisions are associated with security price changes, although this evidence is much 
stronger for pre-announcement changes than for post-announcement. As there is 
considerable interest in using analysts’ forecasts for stock selection purposes in Europe, it 
is clearly of some importance to determine whether forecast revisions are associated with 
security returns, and whether the revisions can be used to trade successfully. We use a 
large sample of individual analysts’ f orecast revisions in Europe’s three largest markets  - 
the U.K., France and Germany – and demonstrate that forecast revisions follow 
significant abnormal returns and can also be used to identify significant, post 
announcement returns. This result is found in all years bar one, is stronger for the U.K. 
than the other markets, for downward than for upward revisions, for less researched 
rather than more researched firms and for forecasts diverging from the consensus rather 
than converging.  Although surprisingly strong evidence against the EMH these results 
are consistent with certain other studies which also demonstrate delayed market reaction 
to news. 
 
JEL class: G10 
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Revisions of Earnings Forecasts and Security Returns: 
Evidence from Three Countries 
 
I. Introduction.  
 
Despite the extensive resources devoted to the production, dissemination and analysis of 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts (FAFs) of earnings there is no clear European 
evidence that these forecasts can be used in stock selection or market timing.  In this 
paper we investigate the security returns observed shortly before and after substantial 
revisions of individual analysts’ forecasts of earnings for firms in the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France.  We also examine whether the returns associated with these 
revisions are affected by characteristics such as forecast horizon; the number of analysts 
following the firm; the number of forecasts made by the broker; and whether the 
revisions is towards or away from the consensus.   
We investigate the U.K., France and Germany because, apart from being the 
three largest securities markets in Europe, they are very different in accounting practices, 
ownership structures and in styles of financial analysis. Despite these differences we find 
that in all three markets security prices are associated with significant earnings forecast 
revisions (for most tests we define significant revisions as changes of greater than plus or 
minus 10%).  This result is stronger for the U.K. sample than for the French or 
Germany. Most of security returns, positive for positive changes in forecasts and vice 
versa, occur during the thirty days before the revision is logged on the I/B/E/S database 
– nevertheless significant post announcement drift occurs after the revision is recorded.  
Of course it may also be the case that the forecast revisions are available to a privileged 
group before they are submitted to I/B/E/S.  This group would be able to realise even 
larger abnormal returns. Further analysis suggests that these results hold for raw returns 
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as well as market adjusted, are to be found in all years studied bar 1987, and are largely 
true for individual brokers as well as the pooled sample.  We do, however, find 
interesting differences between the returns-revision associatio n for forecasts of firms 
followed by many and by few analysts, between forecasts made by prolific brokers and 
others, and for forecasts towards or away from the consensus,. 
Although we examine a relatively short window – 30 days before and 60 days 
after the announcement of the forecast revision – we attempt an estimate of the long run 
returns from the observed pattern of CARs available within our window. This procedure 
suggests that the 60-day post event window has captured just about all the abnormal 
returns available. 
The paper continues with a brief discussion of the relevant differences between 
the three countries; a review of prior literature; an explanation of the research method 
employed; the results; and finally our conclusions. 
 
II. Earnings Measurement, Forecasting and Agency Relationships.  
Firstly, despite the best efforts of the European Union there are still substantive 
differences between the accounting procedures in Union member countries. Joos and 
Lang (1994, p. 142) claim that ‘Germany and the U.K. are the originators, and arguably the most 
extreme examples, of the two primary accounting philosophies world -wide, the Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental models’. France is seen as a useful intermediate example. These differences 
might have two effects.  If accounting measurement practices effect the time series of 
earnings, as they almost certainly do, they may affect the difficulty of forecasting 
earnings.  If the accounting impacts on the degree of association between earnings and 
share value, as again they almost certainly do, then this may affect the utility of earnings 
forecasts as an investment tool (Alford et al. 1993). 
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Secondly, the ownership structure of the three markets is very different.  Under 
such circumstances the agency relationships between investors or their fund managers, 
financial analysts and the management of the firms in question, may differ between the 
three countries. This could affect the information asymmetries and the utility of earnings 
forecasts. Individual shareholders are relatively important in France whereas financial 
institutions dominate in the U.K. and public companies are very influential in Germany 
(London stock Exchange 1995). It might be a reasonable hypothesis that individual 
shareholders have the least influence and  the least access to information; that fund 
managers have considerable influence with the firms that they invest in, but as holders of 
diverse portfolios there may be limited incentive to become involved; and that public 
companies, which have substantial, relatively un-diversified, shareholdings, may have 
both the ability and incentive to take an active role in management and in monitoring the 
firm's performance. The information is incomplete, and the implications tentative, but it 
might be thought that in Germany and the U.K. powerful investors have ready access to, 
and influence over, management whereas in France it might be expected that individual, 
foreign and public sector investors have relatively little power. 
Finally, the structure and practices of the financial analysts’ profession are 
thought to differ (Pike et al. 1993).  In the U.K. the analysts are largely U.K. based, 
working for brokerage houses and following US style working practices; for both French 
and German firms many of the analysts producing forecasts are London based, those 
that are not may work for banks with direct shareholdings in the firms being forecasts, 
and whilst American style working practices are ever more influential, the tradition of 
fundamental analysis is younger than in the U.K.. Capstaff et al. (1997) examined the 
accuracy of financial analysts' forecasts of European companies’ earnings per share. They 
analysed 524,411 forecasts of annual earnings for European firms during the years 1987 
to 1995. The results showed that forecasts of U.K. firms' earnings were relatively 
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accurate, and that forecasts of German firms' earnings were relatively inaccurate, 
although the least biased. For all countries forecasts made within three months of the 
accounting year-end performed relatively well, whilst forecasts made at longer horizons 
had moderate or little predictive value. Optimistic forecasting and overreaction to recent 
information is generic when making forecasts; forecasts based on the firm's share price 
and the market wide price earnings ratio have incremental predictive value beyond that of 
the analysts' forecasts; and revisions of forecasts made by analysts show a systematic 
tendency to reduce previously forecasted changes in earnings.  
 
Implications.  
It is not easy to untangle the implications of the differences in accounting practices, firm 
ownership and the behaviour of financial analysts in the three countries. Briefly the 
higher the association between earnings and share prices, and the more accurate are 
analysts forecasts of the earnings, the stronger the expected reaction to forecast revisions. 
The earnings to price association is apparently highest in the U.K. and lowest in 
Germany (Alford et al. 1993) and the forecasting error is also apparently lower in the 
U.K. than in France which also outperforms Germany (Capstaff et al. 1997). Conversely 
we have suggested that the information asymmetries are probably stronger in France 
than in Germany and the U.K.. The more pervasive such asymmetries the more valuable 
will be the work of analysts and hence the reaction to their pronouncements. So we have 
good reason to suppose that there will be differences in the revision to returns 
association, but that the direction of these differences is uncertain. 
 
III. Prior Evidence. 
A number of studies have investigated the association between earnings forecasts or 
forecast revisions and security returns. Almost all are restricted to the American market 
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and most use consensus forecasts. Elton et al. (1981) using I/B/E/S consensus data 
concluded that investors cannot earn abnormal returns using growth forecasts, but 
Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), using Standard and Poors Earnings Forecaster data, 
Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1982), using Merril Lynch’s Options Alert data, Hawkins et al. 
(1984), using  I/B/E/S consensus data, Freeman and Tse (1989), also using I/B/E/S 
consensus data, and Beneish (1991), using reports in the Wall Street Journal, all provided 
evidence that revisions in analysts forecasts could be used to predict abnormal returns.  
Although there is a spread of data sources and methods applied the general 
agreement seems to be that for the U.S. the forecast revisions contain valuable 
information. However most of these studies are somewhat selective. Givoly and 
Lakonishok (1980) used monthly re-balanced portfolios for 49 firms from only three 
sectors during 1967-74 and find excess returns of 4.7 percent over four months. The 
majority of this return occurs during the month before, and the month of, the revision – 
identified as those of plus or minus 5%. Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1982) using only 288 
revisions concentrate on the possibility of exploiting pre-publication information. They 
show that knowledge of the revision can be used to generate net, after transaction costs, 
excess returns during the two weeks prior to, and the week of, the publication of the 
revision - but not subsequently. Hawkins (1983), using only the 20 largest revisions on 
the I/B/E/S database found that large positive revisions provided over 14 percent 
annualised excess compared to an annual return on the index of 7 percent. The contrary 
result from Elton et al. (1981) was based on the forecast not the change in forecast. 
Perhaps the most interesting study is that of Stickel (1991) who, instead of using 
published forecasts, updates the analyst’s latest prediction using a standard heuristic and 
finds that this updated forecast can be used to trade profitably. 
 All the above studies are based on data from the United States. To date we have 
only come across one study that has investigated abnormal returns associated with 
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forecast revision in other economies. L’Her and Suret (1991) track between 159 and 188 
firms on the Toronto stock exchange during 1985-87. This constitutes approximately 80 
percent of that market’s capitalisation. By allocating each firm month into one of five 
portfolios by size of revision they perform an event study which demonstrates that 
strong pre-event returns are positively associated with the revision, but, more 
significantly, post-event returns are also  positively associated. In the six months following 
the month of revision the portfolio of the most negative changes experienced –3.0 
percent abnormal return and the most positive changes a +3.1 percent excess. 
 Thus, while Brown (1993) in his influential review article concludes that ‘analyst 
forecast revisions can be used to predict subsequent abnormal returns ’, it should be noted that the 
studies he examines are rather particular in coverage and, in the main, demonstrate that 
forecast revisions are associated with pre-disclosure returns. As far as we know there is 
no reliable evidence that these results pertain to any European markets. L’Her and Suret 
(1991) suggest that the differences in the results with regards to the ability of forecast 
revisions to predict excess returns are influenced a) by the sample, which has rarely been 
comprehensive; b) by the selection of those revisions to identify as triggers, and studies 
which have tried to use other than extreme revisions have tended to fail to find post-
event excess returns; c) by the method used to identify abnormal returns – Jensen’s alpha 
for Hawkins et al. (1983), event study methodology L’Her and Suret (1991), and control 
portfolios in Givoly and Lakonishok (1980) and Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1982); and 
finally, by d) the forecast horizon of the revisions. 
 
IV. Research Method. 
 
As changes in analysts’ forecasts are, prima facie , changes in market expectations we expect 
analysts revisions to be associated with changes in security prices. This is our first 
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hypothesis, H01a, below. However, it is unclear whether these changed expectations, 
thought to be reflected in both the price and the forecast, will appear in the price first -
for which we have plenty of robust North American evidence, or whether at least some 
element will appear first in the forecasts -  for which the available evidence is much less 
secure. It is only in this second case that published revisions might obviously be used to 
outperform the market. Thus our second, H01b, and third, H01c, hypotheses test the 
association between security returns, in thirty day windows, both before and after 
publication, plus a further thirty 30 days following that, with analysts’ revisions. 
 In the second set of hypotheses, H02a-e, we test whether certain variations in the 
characteristics of the sample affect the association between security returns and forecast 
revisions. We suggest that the ease of forecasting and value of forecasts will be affected 
by their characteristics. The first of these is the hypothesis regarding country differences, 
H02a. This may be due to, amongst other possible causes, the differences in the 
accounting systems, the variation in the ownership structure of the firms, and the 
financial analysis practices in each country. In H02b we presume that the information 
environment is different for different size firms, and that for smaller firms information 
from analysts, including of course the forecast revisions, may be more valuable. Size 
could be measured by a number of dimensions but we believe the most pertinent is the 
number of analysts following the firm. In hypothesis H02c we also expect that forecast 
revisions by market leaders are likely to be more influential than those of followers. We 
use a simple differentiation that assumes that revisions towards the consensus are less 
likely to be innovative than revisions away from the consensus. Previous evidence, e.g. 
Capstaff et al. (1997), has shown that forecasts for long horizons tend to be inaccurate. 
As the replacement of one inaccurate forecast with another is unlikely to convey much 
information to the market we suggest in hypothesis H02d that revisions at longer 
horizons will be less influential than those at shorter horizons. Finally in H02e we 
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examine whether those brokerage firms which issue many forecasts are more influential 
than those which issue few. 
Hypotheses. 
H01 The announcement of large revisions in FAF has no significant association with 
a) changes in security prices, b) preceding changes in security prices, and c) subsequent 
changes in security prices. 
H02 The association between large revisions in FAF and security prices is not 
different for a) different countries, b) firms with different analyst followings, c) different 
directions of revision relative to consensus, d) different forecast horizons, and e) the 
number of forecasts issued by the forecasters’ firms. 
 
Sample Details.  
The sample is drawn from I/B/E/S research data as at June 1999 which covers the years 
1988 to 1998 inclusive. The sample is restricted to forecasts of EPS for British, French 
and German firms where a) the forecast represents a change in earnings expectations of 
at least 10 percent (a sub -sample of 20 percent revisions is also examined), and b) that 
daily returns data is available from Datastream for 90 days before and after the event 
date. The second restriction is necessary to produce returns for the primary event 
window (-30 to +30 days), an estimation period on which to base the statistical tests (-90 
to –31), and a secondary event window to examine whether market reaction is short lived 
or long run (+31 to +90). 
The sample selection procedure identifies a total of 79,047 events in the U.K., 
24,306 buy indicators and 54,741 sell; 43,606 events in the France, 16,183 buy indicators 
and 27,423 sell; and 35,746 events in the Germany, 13,823 buy indicators and 21,912 sell.  
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Calculation of Returns, Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics. 
Daily security returns, calculated as Pt-Pt-1/Pt-1, are based on information from 
Datastream. The tests are conducted on r aw returns and market adjusted returns where 
the market is assumed to be the FT All Share Index. No adjustment is made for risk. The 
primary event window is short and the observed abnormal returns are large. It is unlikely 
that these results are sensitive to differences in risk. Moreover, since Fama and French 
(1992) it is not clear how risk should be measured. Market model or CAPM betas seems 
to have little association with observed returns and it is not clear how, under such 
circumstances, they can be proxying for risk. Additionally measuring market betas for 
daily returns is problematical and places further data restrictions on the sample. It is not 
clear that attempts to explicitly include risk adjustments into the model do not introduce 
more bias than they eliminate. Nevertheless we do/will examine the sensitivity of our 
results to differences in risk relevant dimensions such as the association with market 
movements, size etc. 
The expected or normal return is defined as the observed market return and hence 
the abnormal return (Ait) is the difference between the company return (R it) and market return 
(Rm t). 
Ait = Rit -Rm t 
By implication this is a special case of market model where the values of a and b are 
imposed to be 0 and 1 respectively. This is useful in an event study where there are no 
sufficient observations in the estimation window to estimate the market model parameters. 
In an event study the aggregation of abnormal returns should be done across the 
sample firms and over-time. One approach of aggregation is to follow the procedure 
suggested by Brown and Warner (1985, section 3.3) 
Estimate the average abnormal return ( A t) for each day (assuming you are using daily 
data) in the sample (estimation window as well as event window) as follows: 
 12 
A
N
At i t
t
Nt
=
=
å1
1
,  
Where N is the number of sample securities whose abnormal returns (A) are available 
at day t. Note that this is a cross sectional average for each day. 
Statistical test of significance of abnormal return (significantly different from zero) for 
time t (usually for the event day) is carried out with a T-statistic estimated as follows: 
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Where ( A t ) is defined as above and S( A t ) is defined as: 
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(note: t = -90 to -31 refers to estimation period relative to the event day 0 i.e. ( )S At  is 
estimate using the data from the estimation period. 
If the measures of ( A t ) are independent, identically distrib uted (IID), and normal, the 
test statistic is distributed Student-t under the null hypothesis. The null being that the mean 
day ‘0’ abnormal return is not different from zero. If the event has a significant impact on the 
returns of the sample companies we expect the null to be rejected.  
The next step is to cumulate the average abnormal return ( A t ) over longer interval 
during the event window i.e. to estimate the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR): 
CARt  = A t+ CAR t-1 
For test over multi-day intervals (say -5 to +5 days relative to the event day), the test 
statistic (T) is estimated as follows (see Brown and Warner, 1985, A3). 
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The S( A t ) is defined as above. The test statistic is assumed unit normal in the absence of 
abnormal performance. 
 
V. Results.  
 
Country Comparisons – Market Adjusted Returns.  
The preliminary results are reported in table 1, and presented graphically in figure 1. 
These results are market adjusted and the events are selected using a 10% trigger. For all 
three markets the analysts’ forecast revisions are associated with statistically significant 
CARs across the 91-day window.  This is strongest for the U.K. where positive revisions 
are associated with a CAR of 2.34 percent and negative revisions are associated with 
more than –10.83 percent. These are large abnormal returns for 91 working days – about 
four months. The CARs for the French market are somewhat smaller – 0.20 percent for 
buy signals and –6.68 for sell. Only the sell CARs are significantly different from zero. 
For German revisions the 91-day CAR for positive revisions is 0.56 percent and for 
negative revisions –8.49 percent. Both are statistically significant.  
 As discussed previously we do not know when the analysts’ forecasts become 
available to investors. Day 0 is the date that I./B/E/S record the forecast as being 
submitted to them. Clearly if the analysts believe that their forecasts are valuable they 
may use them before publicising them. However even if we only assume that investors 
have the forecasts available from day zero there are abnormal returns in the following 
sixty days. The buy and sell portfolios in the U.K., France and Germany demonstrate a 
further CAR of 0.07% and –4.60%; -0.99% and –2.97%; and –0.79 and –4.13% percent 
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respectively between day zero and day +60. It is apparent then that post-event returns 
are largely confined to the sell portfolios. In most cases the buy portfolios are 
insignificantly different from zero. However if we assum e zero investment hedge 
portfolios (see figure 2) we find that the full window and all segmentations thereof 
reported in table 1 are significant. The buy and sell signals always discriminate 
significantly between subsequent returns. 
Table 1 and figures 1 and 2 about here.  
A casual examination of figures 1 and 2 suggests firstly that there is a substantial 
difference between the returns available on UK investments than on France or Germany, 
and that abnormal returns may continue after the event window especially with regard to 
the sell portfolios. We leave the examination of this latter point until the end of the 
results section. However the comparison between countries can be addressed directly. If 
we simplify the analysis by concentrating only on the hedge portfolios we find that UK 
returns are higher than in France, and significantly so, for all the windows reported in 
Table 1.  The same applies for the comparison between the UK and Germany except for 
the +31,+60 event window where the difference is not significant. For each event 
window the larger CARs observed in the German sample are significantly different from 
those found in the French. 
 
Country Comparisons – Unadjusted Returns - 10% Trigger. 
 The ability of forecast revisions to identify raw returns is  shown in figures 3 and 
4. This is of importance as it may well be expected that analysts’ revisions will be valuable 
for market timing as well as stock selection. However on balance the returns over various 
windows for raw returns are much the same for raw returns as for adjusted returns for all 
three markets. As can be seen from a comparison between figures 1 and 3 the pattern has 
shifted, as would be expected. However the hedge returns, figures 2 and 4 are much the 
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same. At this stage it appears that raw returns offer little over adjusted returns as a basis 
for analysis and are not investigated further. 
Figures 3 and 4 about here. 
 
Country Comparisons – Unadjusted Returns - 20% Trigger. 
Clearly if abnormal returns are associated with forecast revisions of greater than 10% it 
may be that even larger returns are associated with larger revisions. In table 2 a set of 
results for those cases where the revision is greater than 20% are given. In all three 
countries the patter is unchanged although both pre and post revision returns are slightly 
increased. As no substantive change has been noticed we no longer deal with this 
reduced sample. 
Table 2 about here. 
 
Country Comparisons – Annual Adjusted Returns.  
We also examine the abnormal returns available from the investment strategy in each 
year within the sample. This is reported in table three. If we concentrate on the 0,+60 
window we see that the buy strategy fails in 5, 7 and 6 cases out of the 12 for the UK, 
France and Germany respectively, the sell strategy fails in 1, 2 and 1 cases, and the hedge 
portfolio only fails in 1 case each for France and Germany. This occurs in 1987 the year 
with the smallest sample. Three things are obvious. There is temporal instability in the 
returns, this is much more apparent in the unreliable buy portfolio than in the sell, and 
the hedge and sell strategies produce abnormal returns and there is no evidence of these 
returns fading. From here onwards we pool the sample and ignore temporal differences. 
Table 3 about here. 
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Distinctions between CARs Segmented by Forecast Characteristics. 
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 contain the results of segmenting the sample by the direction of the 
forecast revision – if away from the consensus it is expected to be more influential; by 
the number of analysts following the firm – revisions for relatively ignored firms are 
expected to be more influential; by forecast horizon – the revisions made at longer 
horizons when forecasts tend to be inaccurate are expected to be less influential; and by 
number of forecasts made by the issuing broker – more prestigious (more active) brokers 
are expected to be more influential. The first, second and forth of these hypotheses are 
consistent with the evidence although it should be acknowledged that the differences are 
relatively small, albeit statistically significant. The supposition that long horizon forecasts 
revisions will be ineffective, because of their known inaccuracy, is clearly not supported 
by the evidence. Indeed the shortest horizon forecasts tend to be among the least 
productive.  
Perhaps one further comment might be appropriate from this section. Of all the 
segmentations made and reported in these tables only one out of 33, the month 1 to 3 
forecast revisions made for French firms, does not report a positive return for the market 
adjusted hedge portfolio. 
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 about here.  
 
Asymptotic estimates of abnormal returns.  
If investors absorb the full value implications of a forecast revision only gradually they 
will impound this into prices only after some time. It would appear from figures 1 to 4 
that CARs may still be increasing at +60. By observing the patter of the CARs within our 
91-day event window we try and predict at what point the CARs will be flat. We 
construct our estimates of asymptotic exposure by proposing a particular but flexible 
functional relationship between the window length and the CAR for the market adjusted 
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hedge portfolio. The functional form chosen for this purpose may be overly flexible for 
what appears to be a straight forward relationship but has the ability to model 
monotonically increasing or decreasing and U-Shaped relationship. 
 In our chosen model let CARij(x) denote market i’s CAR over the returns 
window of length  x. We estimate the horizon dependence of CARij(x) with the 
parametric equation: 
 ( )xbij   =  ija   +  ÷÷ø
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This function is similar to the one used by Rees and Unni (2000) to model the response 
to exchange rate changes. It allows us to capture the slope, curvature and asymptotic 
convergence of CARij(x)  through just four parameters, ija , ijb , ijg  and ijt  which are 
obtained through an iterative estimation procedure.  
The limiting behaviour of exposure at extreme returns horizons is dictated 
entirely by two parameters, ija and ijg . At short windows (i.e. as x ® 0), CARij(x) 
converges to ija + ijg . At the other end, as x  tends to infinity it converges to ija , at a 
speed that is determined by the scaling parameter ijt . Therefore, the parameter ija  gives 
us an estimate of the long run response to forecast revisions.  The results of this 
estimation for the three samples are given in table 8. 
Table 8 about here. 
As can be seen from the R2 values the fitted curve maps very closely onto those 
observed. A comparison of the estimated  a’s with the full 91 day window CARs implies 
that small additional returns are available in the UK (0.63=13.80-13.17) and Germany 
(0.45=9.55-9.05) and that a slight decline might be expected in France (-0.10=6.77-6.87). 
If this tentative estimate is taken at face value it suggests that the returns from a hedge 
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portfolio may have been all but captured by the end of the 60 days following the forecast 
revision. 
 
VI. Conclusion.  
 
In this paper we have examined the security price returns associated with revisio ns of 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings in three European countries. The paper, in using a large 
sample, individual rather than consensus forecasts, and in explicitly investigating key 
characteristics of the revisions and the firms involved, extends the rather uncertain 
results from previous, mostly North American, studies. We find clear evidence that 
revisions may be associated with abnormal returns in the period immediately before and 
after the announcement of the revision. The post announcement returns, those that are 
obviously open to capture, are approximately 4.7% in the UK, 2% in France and 3.3% in 
Germany. Whilst these may not be large returns in the latter two countries after trading 
costs are accounted for, they appear considerable in the UK. The abnormal returns are 
concentrated in the sell portfolios, but otherwise seem pervasive. According to our 
estimate little is left in the hedged abnormal returns after the 91 day window, although it 
simple observation of the sell portfolios suggests that they may not have finished 
generating returns by that time. 
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Table 1. Cumulative Market Adjusted Returns – 
Full Sample – 10% Trigger  
Country  Cases CAR(-30,60) CAR(-30,-1) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(31,60) 
UK Positive 24306 0.0234 0.0227 0.0035 0.0007 -0.0028 
 T-Statistic  11.80 19.94 3.06 0.44 -2.49 
 Negative 54741 -0.1083 -0.0623 -0.0254 -0.0460 -0.0205 
 T-Statistic  -32.02 -32.09 -12.88 -16.60 -10.58 
 Hedge 79047 0.1317 0.0850 0.0290 0.0467 0.0177 
 T-Statistic  30.00 33.73 11.31 12.99 7.03 
      
France Positive 16183 0.0020 0.0118 -0.0041 -0.0099 -0.0058 
 T-Statistic  0.92 9.76 -3.32 -5.71 -4.77 
 Negative 27423 -0.0668 -0.0371 -0.0183 -0.0297 -0.0113 
 T-Statistic  -26.18 -25.35 -12.31 -14.20 -7.74 
 Hedge 43606 0.0687 0.0490 0.0142 0.0198 0.0055 
 T-Statistic  17.79 22.07 6.31 6.25 2.50 
      
Germany Positive 13834 0.0056 0.0135 -0.0033 -0.0079 -0.0046 
 T-Statistic  2.55 10.72 -2.60 -4.40 -3.64 
 Negative 21912 -0.0849 -0.0436 -0.0217 -0.0413 -0.0196 
 T-Statistic  -32.59 -29.14 -14.29 -19.37 -13.10 
 Hedge 35746 0.0905 0.0571 0.0184 0.0334 0.0150 
 T-Statistic  28.30 31.09 9.86 12.76 8.17 
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Table 2. Cumulative Market Adjusted Returns – 
Full Sample – 20% Trigger  
  Cases CAR(-30,60) CAR( -30,-1) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(31,60)
UK Positive  0.0250 0.0236 0.0022 0.0013 -0.0009
 T-Statistics  8.0400 13.2587 1.2096 0.5219 -0.4854
 Negative  -0.1403 -0.0839 -0.0309 -0.0564 -0.0255
 T-Statistics  -31.4942 -32.8098 -11.8680 -15.4578 -9.9779
 Hedge  0.1653 0.1076 0.0331 0.0577 0.0247
 T-Statistics  27.7374 31.4387 9.5045 11.8307 7.2084
      
France Positive  -0.0055 0.0079 -0.0065 -0.0134 -0.0069
 T-Statistics  -1.9345 4.8199 -3.9087 -5.7430 -4.2159
 Negative  -0.0801 -0.0461 -0.0212 -0.0340 -0.0128
 T-Statistics  -24.2751 -24.3290 -11.0028 -12.5879 -6.7651
 Hedge  0.0746 0.0540 0.0147 0.0206 0.0059
 T-Statistics  15.8304 19.9650 5.3362 5.3340 2.1815
      
Germany Positive  0.0144 0.0150 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0006
 T-Statistics  4.6479 8.3924 0.0502 -0.2086 -0.3485
 Negative  -0.0984 -0.0561 -0.0293 -0.0423 -0.0129
 T-Statistics  -22.0733 -21.9306 -11.2732 -11.5806 -5.0538
 Hedge  0.1128 0.0711 0.0294 0.0417 0.0123
 T-Statistics  18.9262 20.7695 8.4559 8.5510 3.5976
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Table 3. Market Adjusted CARs by Year of Forecast. 
 Buy Sell Hedge 
UK -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 
87 -0.014 0.030 0.044 -0.011 0.031 0.042 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 
88 0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.021 -0.007 -0.020 0.031 0.007 0.020 
89 0.012 -0.005 -0.012 -0.044 -0.029 -0.058 0.057 0.024 0.046 
90 0.008 -0.008 -0.021 -0.064 -0.035 -0.061 0.073 0.027 0.040 
91 0.014 -0.007 -0.026 -0.052 -0.026 -0.049 0.066 0.019 0.023 
92 0.031 0.009 0.011 -0.065 -0.032 -0.055 0.096 0.041 0.067 
93 0.049 0.021 0.033 -0.066 -0.020 -0.027 0.116 0.041 0.060 
94 0.034 0.011 0.014 -0.056 -0.006 -0.011 0.090 0.018 0.025 
95 0.018 0.003 0.001 -0.063 -0.015 -0.033 0.081 0.018 0.034 
96 0.024 0.004 0.004 -0.057 -0.019 -0.037 0.081 0.023 0.041 
97 0.019 -0.001 -0.008 -0.070 -0.029 -0.055 0.089 0.028 0.047 
98 0.009 -0.005 -0.017 -0.100 -0.041 -0.078 0.109 0.036 0.061 
 0.018 0.004 0.002 -0.056 -0.019 -0.037 0.074 0.023 0.039 
 Buy Sell Hedge 
France -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 
87 0.074 0.012 -0.019 0.010 0.018 0.005 0.064 -0.0 07 -0.024 
88 0.010 0.003 0.002 -0.014 0.004 0.000 0.023 -0.001 0.002 
89 0.017 0.005 0.008 -0.014 -0.011 -0.025 0.031 0.016 0.033 
90 0.008 -0.001 -0.004 -0.046 -0.021 -0.032 0.054 0.020 0.027 
91 0.012 0.006 0.011 -0.033 -0.012 -0.015 0.045 0.018 0.025 
92 0.022 0.002 0.004 -0.034 -0.012 -0.016 0.056 0.015 0.020 
93 0.018 0.006 0.007 -0.028 -0.008 -0.003 0.045 0.014 0.010 
94 0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.024 -0.014 -0.015 0.032 0.007 0.010 
95 0.006 -0.007 -0.014 -0.036 -0.017 -0.034 0.042 0.010 0.020 
96 0.006 -0.005 -0.014 -0.037 -0.019 -0.038 0.044 0.014 0.024 
97 0.015 -0.006 -0.009 -0.041 -0.028 -0.045 0.057 0.022 0.035 
98 0.014 -0.005 -0.025 -0.059 -0.041 -0.051 0.073 0.036 0.026 
 0.017 0.000 -0.005 -0.030 -0.013 -0.022 0.047 0.014 0.017 
 Buy Sell Hedge 
Germany -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 -30,-1 0,+30 0,+60 
87 0.009 0.016 0.017 -0.008 0.022 0.030 0.017 -0.006 -0.013 
88 0.015 0.008 0.010 -0.019 -0.007 -0.007 0.034 0.015 0.018 
89 0.020 0.013 0.023 -0.025 -0.008 -0.021 0.045 0.021 0.044 
90 0.027 0.005 0.008 -0.025 -0.016 -0.025 0.052 0.021 0.033 
91 0.018 0.003 -0.014 -0.046 -0.026 -0.041 0.064 0.028 0.028 
92 0.009 -0.001 -0.010 -0.044 -0.025 -0.044 0.053 0.024 0.034 
93 0.017 0.004 0.007 -0.033 -0.011 -0.016 0.050 0.016 0.022 
94 0.015 0.003 0.004 -0.022 -0.008 -0.014 0.037 0.011 0.018 
95 0.003 -0.008 -0.020 -0.052 -0.027 -0.058 0.055 0.019 0.038 
96 0.003 -0.007 -0.021 -0.063 -0.035 -0.073 0.066 0.028 0.052 
97 0.018 -0.013 -0.016 -0.056 -0.028 -0.056 0.074 0.015 0.040 
98 0.022 -0.005 -0.013 -0.053 -0.041 -0.049 0.075 0.036 0.036 
 0.015 0.001 -0.002 -0.037 -0.017 -0.031 0.052 0.019 0.029 
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Table 4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns –  
Segmented by the Direction of Revision  
  cases CAR(-30,60) CAR(-30,-1) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(31,60) 
UK-Towards the mean      
 Positive 13866 0.0186 0.0207 0.0030 -0.0021 -0.0051 
 T-Stat.  7.83 15.18 2.16 -1.09 -3.75 
 Negative 29651 -0.0984 -0.0547 -0.0247 -0.0437 -0.0189 
 T-Stat.  -29.33 -28.42 -12.63 -15.90 -9.83 
 Hedge 43517 0.1170 0.0754 0.0277 0.0416 0.0138 
 T-Stat.  27.00 30.32 10.96 11.72 5.57 
UK -Away from the Mean      
 Positive 10440 0.0298 0.0253 0.0043 0.0045 0.0002 
 T-Stat.  11.28 16.68 2.82 2.08 0.11 
 Negative 25090 -0.1200 -0.0713 -0.0263 -0.0487 -0.0224 
 T-Stat.  -32.30 -33.41 -12.14 -16.01 -10.49 
 Hedge 35530 0.1498 0.0966 0.0307 0.0532 0.0225 
 T-Stat.  28.88 32.43 10.13 12.53 7.57 
Fr –Towards the mean      
 Positive 8082 0.0001 0.0107 -0.0044 -0.0106 -0.0061 
 T-Stat.  0.04 7.27 -2.98 -5.04 -4.17 
 Negative 15335 -0.0591 -0.0322 -0.0175 -0.0269 -0.0094 
 T-Stat.  -22.70 -21.54 -11.52 -12.62 -6.28 
 Hedge 23417 0.0592 0.0429 0.0131 0.0163 0.0033 
 T-Stat.  15.57 19.64 5.88 5.24 1.49 
FR-Away from the Mean      
 Positive 8101 0.0038 0.0130 -0.0037 -0.0092 -0.0055 
 T-Stat.  1.41 8.38 -2.36 -4.15 -3.52 
 Negative 12088 -0.0765 -0.0434 -0.0194 -0.0332 -0.0138 
 T-Stat.  -25.41 -25.08 -11.03 -13.44 -7.96 
 Hedge 20189 0.0803 0.0564 0.0157 0.0240 0.0083 
 T-Stat.  16.58 20.26 5.54 6.05 2.99 
Gr-Towards the mean     
 Positive 7501 0.0047 0.0128 -0.0043 -0.0081 -0.0038 
 T-Stat.  1.68 8.01 -2.65 -3.56 -2.39 
 Negative 11477 -0.0797 -0.0391 -0.0215 -0.0406 -0.0191 
 T-Stat.  -26.91 -22.98 -12.44 -16.75 -11.24 
 Hedge 18978 0.0844 0.0519 0.0172 0.0325 0.0153 
 T-Stat.  23.10 24.75 8.07 10.86 7.29 
Gr-Away from the Mean     
 Positive 6333 0.0066 0.0143 -0.0022 -0.0077 -0.0055 
 T-Stat.  2.60 9.74 -1.48 -3.66 -3.71 
 Negative 10435 -0.0908 -0.0486 -0.0220 -0.0422 -0.0202 
 T-Stat.  -30.98 -28.89 -12.85 -17.58 -12.00 
 Hedge 16768 0.0974 0.0629 0.0198 0.0345 0.0147 
 T-Stat.  24.71 27.79 8.59 10.69 6.51 
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Table 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns –  
Segmented by Analyst Following 
Country  CAR(-30,60) CAR( -30,-1) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(31,60) 
UK Positive 6007 0.0282 0.0210 0.0059 0.0072 0.0013
High T-Stat. 9.21 11.97 3.31 2.86 0.72
 Negative 10907 -0.0496 -0.0339 -0.0100 -0.0157 -0.0058
 T-Stat. -17.26 -20.54 -5.94 -6.68 -3.49
 Hedge 16914 0.0778 0.0549 0.0159 0.0229 0.0070
 T-Stat. 17.43 21.43 6.09 6.27 2.74
UK Positive 18299 0.0218 0.0232 0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0042
Low T-Stat. 10.05 18.62 2.18 -0.79 -3.34
 Negative 43834 -0.1229 -0.0694 -0.0293 -0.0535 -0.0242
 T-Stat. -31.99 -31.46 -13.06 -17.01 -10.98
 Hedge 62133 0.1447 0.0926 0.0320 0.0521 0.0201
 T-Stat. 30.76 34.29 11.67 13.53 7.43
France Positive 7520 0.0106 0.0137 -0.0005 -0.0030 -0.0025 
High T-Stat.  4.74 10.61 -0.38 -1.65 -1.96 
 Negative 12807 -0.0421 -0.0269 -0.0100 -0.0152 -0.0052 
 T-Stat.  -16.77 -18.69 -6.83 -7.38 -3.59 
 Hedge 20327 0.0527 0.0406 0.0095 0.0121 0.0026 
 T-Stat.  13.96 18.72 4.31 3.92 1.21 
France Positive 8663 -0.0056 0.0102 -0.0072 -0.0158 -0.0086 
Low T-Stat.  -1.88 6.01 -4.16 -6.51 -5.05 
 Negative 14616 -0.0884 -0.0460 -0.0256 -0.0424 -0.0168 
 T-Stat.  -25.35 -22.99 -12.59 -14.85 -8.37 
 Hedge 23279 0.0828 0.0563 0.0184 0.0265 0.0081 
 T-Stat.  17.07 20.20 6.50 6.68 2.92 
Germany Positive 9686 0.0112 0.0136 -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0011 
High T-Stat.  4.77 10.12 -0.96 -1.27 -0.84 
 Negative 13962 -0.0695 -0.0394 -0.0157 -0.0301 -0.0144 
 T-Stat.  -24.84 -24.53 -9.63 -13.14 -8.94 
 Hedge 23648 0.0807 0.0530 0.0144 0.0277 0.0132 
 T-Stat.  24.47 28.01 7.50 10.25 6.99 
Germany Positive 4148 -0.0075 0.0131 -0.0080 -0.0206 -0.0126 
Low T-Stat.  -1.90 5.80 -3.47 -6.39 -5.58 
 Negative 7950 -0.1120 -0.0510 -0.0323 -0.0610 -0.0287 
 T-Stat.  -33.42 -26.50 -16.50 -22.24 -14.94 
 Hedge 12098 0.1045 0.0641 0.0243 0.0404 0.0161 
 T-Stat.  20.65 22.06 8.22 9.74 5.54 
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Table 6a. Cumulative Abnormal Returns –  
Segmented by Forecast Horizon (United Kingdom) 
Horizon  Cases CAR(-30,60) CAR(-30,-1) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(31,60)
-3 to 0  Positive 3201 0.0204 0.0027 0.0081 0.0177 0.0096
 T-Stat.  4.92 1.13 3.36 5.22 4.03
 Negative 8035 -0.0633 -0.0580 -0.0066 -0.0053 0.0013
 T-Stat.  -22.25 -35.50 -3.95 -2.28 0.77
 Hedge 11236 0.0837 0.0607 0.0147 0.0230 0.0083
 T-Stat.  17.06 21.54 5.13 5.73 2.96
 1 to 3 Positive 4263 0.0009 0.0181 -0.0074 -0.0172 -0.0097
 T-Stat.  0.23 8.04 -3.25 -5.35 -4.33
 Negative 10133 -0.1377 -0.0712 -0.0347 -0.0665 -0.0318
 T-Stat.  -20.56 -18.51 -8.88 -12.13 -8.27
 Hedge 14396 0.1386 0.0893 0.0273 0.0494 0.0221
 T-Stat.  23.26 26.09 7.84 10.11 6.45
4 to 6 Positive 2923 0.0089 0.0123 0.0003 -0.0033 -0.0036
 T-Stat.  2.24 5.35 0.14 -1.02 -1.59
 Negative 7496 -0.1557 -0.0773 -0.0458 -0.0785 -0.0326
 T-Stat.  -33.35 -28.81 -16.82 -20.53 -12.18
 Hedge 10419 0.1647 0.0895 0.0462 0.0752 0.0290
 T-Stat.  27.53 26.06 13.22 15.35 8.44
7 to 12 Positive 8027 0.0459 0.0371 0.0114 0.0088 -0.0026
 T-Stat.  14.24 20.02 6.06 3.35 -1.39
 Negative 15307 -0.0674 -0.0407 -0.0109 -0.0267 -0.0158
 T-Stat.  -32.23 -33.89 -8.90 -15.60 -13.19
 Hedge 23334 0.1133 0.0778 0.0223 0.0356 0.0133
 T-Stat.  31.10 37.17 10.47 11.91 6.35
13 to 20 Positive 5892 0.0181 0.0225 0.0000 -0.0044 -0.0044
 T-Stat.  6.27 13.56 0.03 -1.85 -2.67
 Negative 13770 -0.1327 -0.0743 -0.0347 -0.0583 -0.0236
 T-Stat.  -23.54 -22.97 -10.56 -12.64 -7.29
 Hedge 19662 0.1508 0.0968 0.0348 0.0540 0.0192
 T-Stat.  24.59 27.50 9.72 10.75 5.45
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Table 6b. Cumulative Abnormal Returns –  
Segmented by Forecast Horizon (France)  
Horizon  Cases CAR(-30,60) CAR(-30,-1) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(31,60) 
-3 to 0  Positive 2432 0.0041 0.0070 -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0003 
 T-Stat.  0.94 2.77 -0.99 -0.79 -0.12 
 Negative 4337 -0.0388 -0.0240 -0.0085 -0.0148 -0.0063 
 T-Stat.  -9.41 -10.15 -3.53 -4.37 -2.64 
 Hedge 6769 0.0429 0.0310 0.0060 0.0119 0.0060 
 T-Stat.  8.80 11.07 2.10 2.98 2.13 
 1 to 3 Positive 3138 -0.0338 -0.0012 -0.0144 -0.0326 -0.0182 
 T-Stat.  -9.97 -0.61 -7.30 -11.75 -9.34 
 Negative 5479 -0.0970 -0.0591 -0.0258 -0.0378 -0.0121 
 T-Stat.  -19.15 -20.35 -8.72 -9.13 -4.15 
 Hedge 8617 0.0632 0.0580 0.0113 0.0052 -0.0061 
 T-Stat.  10.61 16.96 3.26 1.07 -1.79 
4 to 6  Positive 2159 0.0010 0.0127 0.0011 -0.0117 -0.0127 
 T-Stat.  0.22 4.96 0.41 -3.21 -4.99 
 Negative 3355 -0.0752 -0.0287 -0.0221 -0.0466 -0.0245 
 T-Stat.  -20.29 -13.46 -10.21 -15.34 -11.50 
 Hedge 5514 0.0762 0.0413 0.0232 0.0349 0.0117 
 T-Stat.  14.10 13.31 7.35 7.89 3.78 
7 to 12 Positive 4720 0.0256 0.0198 0.0021 0.0059 0.0038 
 T-Stat.  7.11 9.56 0.99 1.99 1.82 
 Negative 7699 -0.0397 -0.0206 -0.0111 -0.0190 -0.0079 
 T-Stat.  -17.24 -15.63 -8.25 -10.09 -6.00 
 Hedge 12419 0.0653 0.0404 0.0132 0.0249 0.0117 
 T-Stat.  14.71 15.86 5.09 6.85 4.59 
13 to 20 Positive 3734 0.0011 0.0154 -0.0072 -0.0143 -0.0072 
 T-Stat.  0.34 8.29 -3.79 -5.40 -3.85 
 Negative 6553 -0.0877 -0.0512 -0.0252 -0.0366 -0.0114 
 T-Stat.  -23.94 -24.31 -11.77 -12.19 -5.41 
 Hedge 10287 0.0888 0.0666 0.0180 0.0222 0.0042 
 T-Stat.  15.15 19.77 5.26 4.63 1.25 
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Table 6c. Cumulative Abnormal Returns –  
Segmented by Forecast Horizon (Germany)  
Horizon  Cases CAR(-30,60) CAR(-30,-1) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(31,60) 
-3 to 0  Positive 2148 0.0010 0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0035 -0.0007 
 T-Stat.  0.19 1.46 -0.91 -0.80 -0.21 
 Negative 3701 -0.0674 -0.0461 -0.0122 -0.0213 -0.0091 
 T-Stat.  -13.51 -16.10 -4.21 -5.22 -3.16 
 Hedge  0.0684 0.0506 0.0094 0.0178 0.0084 
 T-Stat.  13.39 17.26 3.14 4.25 2.86 
 1 to 3 Positive 1986 -0.0292 0.0013 -0.0165 -0.0305 -0.0140 
 T-Stat.  -6.11 0.48 -5.91 -7.80 -5.11 
 Negative 3455 -0.1241 -0.0537 -0.0413 -0.0705 -0.0292 
 T-Stat.  -25.07 -18.88 -14.28 -17.38 -10.27 
 Hedge  0.0949 0.0550 0.0248 0.0399 0.0152 
 T-Stat.  16.87 17.03 7.54 8.67 4.70 
4 to 6  Positive 3106 0.0023 0.0125 -0.0050 -0.0103 -0.0052 
 T-Stat.  0.47 4.52 -1.79 -2.60 -1.89 
 Negative 3987 -0.0806 -0.0316 -0.0220 -0.0490 -0.0271 
 T-Stat.  -21.14 -14.43 -9.87 -15.70 -12.36 
 Hedge  0.0829 0.0441 0.0169 0.0388 0.0218 
 T-Stat.  17.39 16.12 6.09 9.93 7.97 
7 to 12 Positive 3994 0.0314 0.0230 0.0064 0.0085 0.0020 
 T-Stat.  9.32 11.87 3.26 3.06 1.06 
 Negative 6629 -0.0577 -0.0370 -0.0100 -0.0207 -0.0107 
 T-Stat.  -19.63 -21.94 -5.80 -8.59 -6.36 
 Hedge  0.0891 0.0600 0.0164 0.0291 0.0128 
 T-Stat.  20.11 23.57 6.32 8.03 5.02 
13 to 20 Positive 2600 0.0005 0.0167 -0.0061 -0.0162 -0.0101 
 T-Stat.  0.16 8.93 -3.19 -6.07 -5.42 
 Negative 4140 -0.1163 -0.0556 -0.0326 -0.0607 -0.0281 
 T-Stat.  -29.76 -24.77 -14.30 -18.98 -12.52 
 Hedge  0.1168 0.0723 0.0266 0.0445 0.0180 
 T-Stat.  22.94 24.73 8.94 10.68 6.15 
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Table 7. Cumulative Abnormal Returns –  
Segmented by Broker’s Forecast Activity 
 cases CAR(-30,60) CAR(-30,-1) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(31,60) 
UK Positive 14584 0.0283 0.0256 0.0049 0.0027 -0.0022 
High T-Statistic  12.32 19.42 3.66 1.43 -1.68 
 Negative 34860 -0.1096 -0.0639 -0.0258 -0.0457 -0.0200 
 T-Statistic  -29.67 -30.11 -11.94 -15.12 -9.42 
 Hedge 49444 0.1379 0.0895 0.0307 0.0484 0.0178 
 T-Statistic  28.88 32.63 11.00 12.38 6.48 
UK Positive 9722 0.0159 0.0182 0.0014 -0.0023 -0.0038 
Low T-Statistic  6.19 12.37 0.94 -1.12 -2.55 
 Negative 19881 -0.1060 -0.0596 -0.0249 -0.0464 -0.0215 
 T-Statistic  -30.20 -29.58 -12.15 -16.15 -10.68 
 Hedge 29603 0.1219 0.0778 0.0263 0.0441 0.0178 
 T-Statistic  26.51 29.48 9.80 11.71 6.73 
France Positive 6000 0.0054 0.0137 -0.0034 -0.0083 -0.0049 
High T-Statistic  1.75 7.70 -1.87 -3.26 -2.75 
 Negative 10305 -0.0697 -0.0384 -0.0199 -0.0313 -0.0114 
 T-Statistic  -21.41 -20.55 -10.46 -11.73 -6.10 
 Hedge 16305 0.0752 0.0522 0.0165 0.0230 0.0065 
 T-Statistic  15.40 18.61 5.78 5.75 2.32 
France Positive 10183 -0.0002 0.0107 -0.0045 -0.0108 -0.0063 
Low T-Statistic  -0.07 8.11 -3.37 -5.77 -4.80 
 Negative 17118 -0.0650 -0.0363 -0.0174 -0.0287 -0.0113 
 T-Statistic  -24.60 -23.94 -11.27 -13.25 -7.45 
 Hedge 27301 0.0649 0.0470 0.0129 0.0178 0.0050 
 T-Statistic  16.12 20.35 5.47 5.41 2.15 
Germany Positive 5517 0.0093 0.0160 -0.0021 -0.0066 -0.0045 
High T-Statistic  2.77 8.24 -1.06 -2.40 -2.34 
 Negative 9243 -0.0926 -0.0458 -0.0241 -0.0468 -0.0228 
 T-Statistic  -26.75 -23.02 -11.92 -16.53 -11.46 
 Hedge 14760 0.1019 0.0617 0.0220 0.0402 0.0182 
 T-Statistic  23.19 24.45 8.57 11.18 7.23 
Germany Positive 8317 0.0032 0.0119 -0.0042 -0.0087 -0.0046 
Low T-Statistic  1.45 9.48 -3.26 -4.87 -3.64 
 Negative 12669 -0.0794 -0.0421 -0.0200 -0.0373 -0.0172 
 T-Statistic  -26.73 -24.67 -11.57 -15.34 -10.12 
 Hedge 20986 0.0825 0.0540 0.0159 0.0286 0.0127 
 T-Statistic  22.37 25.48 7.37 9.45 5.98 
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Table 8. Asymptotic Model of Long Run Hedge Portfolio Adjusted Returns 
 Alpha  Beta Gamma Tau R2 
UK 0.1380 -0.0039 -0.1444 32 99.7 
t-statistic 156.79 -1.42 -166.09   
France 0.0677 -0.0552 -0.0666 14 99.7 
t-statistic 376.60 -49.26 -107.03   
Germany 0.0955 -0.0085 -0.0995 33 99.4 
t-statistic 107.62 -3.14 -117.66   
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FIGURE 1   Market Adjusted CARs - Full Sample
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FIGURE 2   Market Adjusted CARs - Full Sample - Hedge Portfolios
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FIGURE 3   Unadjusted CARs - Full Sample
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FIGURE 4  Unadjusted CARs - Full Sample Hedge 
Portfolios
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